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The concerns regarding the economic insecurity stemming from earnings instability
have been gaining momentum in the contemporary political discourse. If earn-
ings instability is as a proxy for risk, for risk-averse individuals, increasing earnings
instability bears substantial welfare costs. Using the variance of transitory earn-
ings estimated using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the
OECD labour market indicators, we explore by means of non-linear least squares
the relationship between earnings instability and labour market policies/institutions
across Europe in the 1990s. We ￿nd of a complex system of interactions within
the institutional framework a￿ecting earnings instability. For an average country
with a low corporatism, we ￿nd a U-shape relationship between earnings instability
and the strictness of labour market regulation. Corporatist systems have a lower
earnings instability than decentralized economies, they are e￿ective in reducing the
adverse e￿ects of macroeconomic shocks on earnings instability, and can counteract
the increase in earnings instability associated with the development of ALMPs, with
unionization, with product market regulation and with the tax wedge. The earnings
instability associated with developed ALMPs is reduced by regulated labour mar-
kets, a high corporatism, low non-wage labour costs and high unemployment bene￿t
replacement rates (UBRR). The decrease in earnings instability associated with an
increase in the UBRR is the largest for developed ALMPs.
Keywords: economic insecurity, earnings instability, labour market institutions;
labour market policies and institutions
JEL classi￿cation codes : C23, D31, J31, J60, J50, J08
This paper represents an updated version of Sologon, Denisa M. and O’Donoghue, Cathal.2009. Policy,
Institutional Factors and Earnings Mobility. IZA Discussion Series, No. 4151 (May). This research is part
of the ￿Earnings Dynamics and Microsimulation￿ project supported by an AFR grant (PDR no. 893613) from
the Luxembourg ￿Fonds National de la Recherche￿ cofunded under the Marie Curie Actions of the European
Commission (FP7-COFUND).1 Introduction
The concept of economic insecurity has been gaining an increasing attention over the past decades
both in a national and cross-national context, fueled by the raising concerns regarding the im-
pact of globalization on the security of well-payed jobs and of welfare safety nets in the world’s
advanced economies (Hacker, 2006, Mughan, 2007, Milberg and Winkler, 2009). According to
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), economic security represents "basic social security,
de￿ned by access to basic needs infrastructure pertaining to health, education, dwelling, infor-
mation, and social protection, as well as work-related security"1. Central to the "work-related
security" is "income security" which "denotes adequate actual, perceived and expected income,
either earned or in the form of social security and other bene￿ts"2. Income security is a main
determinant of household welfare and there are a number of factors that in￿uence it: policy
changes, employment shocks, capital market shocks, changes in the structure of labour market
earnings. Since labour market earnings are the main source of household income, a large part of
economic/income (in)security is determined by labour market earnings (in)security. The focus
of this paper is on this driver of economic/income (in)security, namely labour market earnings
(in)security. It is not about one-o￿ shocks, but about systematic changes the earnings structure
in terms of increased earnings instability or year-to-year ￿uctuations and risk.
The welfare implications of increasing earnings instability are not straightforward. Since
existing evidence shows that consumption is well insulated from transitory shocks (Attanasio
and Davis, 1996), increasing earnings instability is unlikely to reduce welfare through consump-
tion. If we consider earnings instability as a proxy for risk and that individuals are averse to
earnings variability and future income risk, then increasing earnings instability may carry sub-
stantial welfare costs (Blundell and Preston, 1998, Creedy and Wilhelm, 2002, Gottschalk and
Spolaore, 2002). These ￿ndings have fueled the increasing concerns about the economic security
of American families in the contemporary political discourse (Nichols and Zimmerman, 2008).
Our measure of earnings instability is derived from the transitory component of earnings
which captures the volatility in the labour market, random events in￿uencing earnings in a
particular period, expected to average out over time, unlike the permanent component which
re￿ects persistent individual characteristics such as ability, education, training (Friedman and
Kuznets, 1954). Under the independence assumption, overall inequality at any point in time
is composed of permanent inequality and transitory inequality. A growing persistent inequality
1ILO (n.d.)
2ILO (n.d.)
1indicates a growing inequality in lifetime or long-term resources. A growing transitory inequality
indicates that individuals are facing an increase in the year-to-year earning ￿uctuations (insta-
bility) (Baker and Solon, 2003). Thus our measure of earnings instability is the variance in
the transitory component of earnings or transitory earnings inequality. One must di￿erentiate
between the concept of earnings instability and earnings mobility, which is de￿ned as the degree
to which individual’s rank changes within the wage distribution and which is determined by the
ratio between the two components of inequality (Kalwij and Alessie, 2003): a large contribution
of permanent inequality indicates that individual earnings are highly correlated over time and
individuals experience low rates of earnings mobility.
The number of studies interested in exploring the trends in the two components of earn-
ings inequality have been growing over the past decades. In the US and Canada, the most
representative contributions are Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy
(1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Mo￿tt and Gottschalk (1995, 1998, 2002, 2008), Baker (1997),
Baker and Solon (2003). The increased availability of panel datasets has favored the growth
of these studies also in Europe. The most representative national studies are Dickens (2000),
Ramos (2003), Kalwij and Alessie (2003), Cappellari (2004), Gustavsson (2004), and most re-
cent, Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010) (also in Sologon (2010)) - the ￿rst cross-national consistent
comparative study in Europe. These studies, however, are limited to documenting the extent to
which changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality re￿ect changes in the transitory or perma-
nent inequality, without explaining the potential driving factors behind earnings instability and
persistent inequality. Sologon and O’Donoghue (2011) take the ￿rst step and explore the role
of labour market policies and institutions in understanding the cross-national di￿erences in per-
sistent earnings inequality across Europe. For earnings instability, as measured by the variance
in the transitory component of earnings, however, to the best of our knowledge, a similar study
does not exist.
We take the ￿rst step in this study and we explore the complex relationship between earnings
instability and labour market policies and institutions using data for 14 European countries be-
tween 1994 and 2001. We consider the institutional factors associated with economic insecurity:
the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), the degree of support in the labour
market as public expenditure for active labour market programmes (ALMPs) (as % of GDP)
and the average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate (UBRR), the degree of unionization
and corporatism, and the product market regulation (PMR). Additionally we consider a set of
macroeconomic shocks expected to a￿ect economic insecurity and implictly earnings instability.
In Europe, this question has become increasingly relevant in the context of the economic reality
2of the 1990s: the implementation of the single market (1992) and the preparation of the single
currency (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993) increased the pressure on the European labour
markets to change. Since the early 1990s, in￿uenced by the 1994 OECD Job Strategy, Europe
has been moving towards more ￿exible labour markets (OECD, 2004). The pace of change was
di￿erent across Europe (Palier, 2010) supporting the expectation of increased country hetero-
geneity with respect to the labour market structure and the distribution of labour market income
across Europe. We investigate whether the heterogeneity in the main labour market policy and
institutional factors can help us understand the cross-national di￿erences in earnings instability
across Europe. Is increased labour market ￿exibility likely to be associated with an increasing
earnings instability?
Using the OECD data on labour market policies and institutions for 14 EU countries and the
predicted transitory inequality from Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010)(also in Sologon (2010)) as
our measure of earnings instability, we apply a non-linear least squares method to explore the
complex relationship between earnings instability and labour market policies and institutions.
2 Theoretical links between earnings instability and labour market policies
and institutions
Katz and Autor (1999) underlines that the rise of earnings instability is "a bit of a puzzle
for hypotheses only emphasizing rising skills prices associated with increased growth in the
demand for skills relative to the supply of skills". However, some explanations can be formulated.
The increase in earnings instability may be attributed to an increased earnings exposure to
macroeconomic shocks, a rise in the temporary workforce which increases earnings exposure
to shocks, an increased labour market volatility, an increased competitiveness, globalization,
an increased international capital mobility (Rodrik, 1997, Katz and Autor, 1999). A period
of skill-biased technological change with the spread of new technologies can, on the one hand,
increase the demand for skills, and on the other hand increase earnings instability, as ￿rms face
uncertainty with respect to the abilities of their workers (Katz and Autor, 1999).
The labour market institutional framework is expected to be a ￿ltering mechanism aimed to
minimize the adverse e￿ects of macroeconomic shocks on earnings instability. The weakening of
the labour market institutions (e.g. unions, government wage regulation) in ￿ltering the impact
of macroeconomic shocks on earnings is expected to be among the factors increasing earnings
instability (Rodrik, 1997; Katz and Autor, 1999).
Across age groups, as postulated by Freeman’s (1975) "active labour market hypothesis",
similarly with overall income, supply and demand factors together with the other macroeconomic
3shocks are expected to have the largest e￿ect on the youngest generations of workers, as they
have a weaker attachment to the labour market and a lower labour protection compared with
senior workers.
Economic theory and previous empirical studies have identi￿ed a number of relevant policy
and institutional factors expected to be associated with earnings instability. These include
inter alia: (i) Employment protection legislation (EPL); (ii) Trade unions and the structure
of collective bargaining; (iii) Product market regulation (PMR); (iv) The public spending on
active labour market policies (ALMPs); (vi) The average unemployment bene￿t replacement
rate (UBRR); (vii) The tax wedge (the sum of the personal income tax and all social security
contributions as a percentage of total labour cost). Based on the standard wage-setting/price-
setting (WS/PS) model (Layard et al., 1991), any factor that a￿ects the slope of the wage-setting
curve (the degree of unionization and of corporatism, the PMR, the unemployment bene￿ts) and
the slope of the price-setting curve (the EPL, the PMR, the tax wedge) may be expected to
interact with policies and institutions that a￿ect the level of the wage-setting (the unemployment
bene￿ts) and the level of the price-setting curve (the PMR) (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a,b). All
possible interactions across policies and institutions can a￿ect earnings instability, and which
policies complement/substitute each other should be established empirically.
To sum up, earnings instability may result from changes in labour market policies and insti-
tutions and the sensitivity of wages to shocks in market conditions. Compared with persistent
inequality (Sologon and O’Donoghue, 2011), earnings instability is expected to be driven to a
larger extent by macroeconomic shocks, but its ￿nal evolution depends on the ability of the
labour market policy and institutions to minimize the adverse e￿ects of these shocks.
3 Methodology
3.1 Measuring earnings instability
The measure of earnings instability that we use emerges from the branch of literature which uses
complex parametric models of earnings dynamics to decompose overall inequality into transitory
inequality and permanent inequality (Baker, 1997, Dickens, 2000, Mo￿tt and Gottschalk, 2002,
1995, Haider, 2001, Baker and Solon, 2003, Ramos, 2003, Kalwij and Alessie, 2003, Cappellari,
2004). Our measure of earnings instability is the variance in the transitory component of in-
dividual earnings. Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), in Sologon and
O’Donoghue (2010) (also in Sologon (2010)) we estimate the covariance structure of earnings by
four birth cohorts for each country and decompose earnings inequality into a permanent and a
4transitory component using equally weighted minimum distance methods. Please refer to this
study for a complete description of the estimation method. In the present study, we use the
predicted transitory inequality as our measure of earnings instability to assess its link with the
labour market policies and institutions.
The general speci￿cation of the transitory component of earnings is an ARMA(1,1) process
with time and cohort speci￿c shifters:
ctvit = ct[vi;t 1 + it + i;t 1];it  iid(0;2
);vi0  iid(0;2
c;0) (1)
The time and cohort shifters allow the structure of transitory earnings to vary over time and
across cohorts. it is assumed to be white noise, the variance 2
c;0 measures the volatility of shocks
in the ￿rst period for each cohort and 2
 the volatility of shocks in subsequent years.  is the
autoregressive parameter measuring the persistence of shocks. 3 Earnings instability measured as
the transitory variance in year t is estimated as the V ar(ctvit).
The aggregation to obtain the overall inequality from the within-cohort inequalities for each









where nc, PVc, TVc are the population share, the permanent variance, the transitory variance
of cohort c. Our dependent variable, overall within-cohort transitory inequality, is: TV =
P4
c=1 ncTVc
3.2 Estimation of the link between earnings instability and labour market
policies and institutions
The relationship between earnings instability, measured by the transitory variance, and labour
market policies and institutions is estimated using non-linear least squares, for all countries
pooled together. The unit of analysis is the country observed between 1994 and 2001. 4 Two
steps are envisaged. First, we test whether policies interact with the overall institutional frame-
work in shaping earnings instability. Second, we test whether institutions interact with the
macroeconomic shocks in shaping earnings instability. Macroeconomic shocks are treated ini-
3The MA parameter , which accommodates sharp drops in the lag-1 autocovariance compared with the other
autocovariances, was found to di￿er signi￿cantly from 0 only in Italy, Greece and Spain.
4Exceptions are Luxembourg and Austria observed between 1995 and 2001, and Finland between 1996 and
2001.
5tially as unobservable but common to all countries - as time e￿ects -, and lastly as observable
and country-speci￿c.
These regressions su￿er from two problems which prevent the establishment of causality:
￿rst, the endogeneity between institutions and overall inequality is expected to a￿ect also the
relationship between institutions and transitory inequality, and second, the unobserved country-
heterogeneity. These are long-standing and unsettled problems in the debate regarding the im-
pact of labour market institutions, technological change, globalization, immigration on earnings
inequality, expected to a￿ect transitory inequality. The absence of good instruments prevents
the establishment of causality. The estimated parameters should be interpreted as complex con-
trolled associations between earnings instability and the institutional framework, and not causal
relationships.
3.2.1 Systemic Interactions
The interactions between institutions are speci￿ed in a multiplicative form between the deviations
of the respective institutions from their sample mean, as is usually done in macroeconomic equa-
tions. This speci￿cation enables the interpretation of the marginal e￿ect of each institution when
the others are kept constant at the sample mean. Undertaking a systematic analysis of policy
interactions is not straightforward, as a model with seven policies/institutions implies including
21 cross-interactions, thereby inducing a substantial loss of degrees of freedom. To avoid this,
we adopt an alternative strategy, similarly with Bassanini and Duval (2006a) for unemployment
and Sologon and O’Donoghue (2011) for persistent inequality. We estimate systemic interac-
tions, meaning interactions between each policy/institution and the overall institutional setting,
de￿ned as the sum of the direct e￿ects of the policies/institutions. The model speci￿cation is







'k(Xkit    X)(
K X
k=1
vk(Xkit    Xk)) + uit (3)
i, t and k are the country, the period and the institution index. TVit is the transitory variance
of country i in year t. The parameters vk and 'k are estimated simultaneously using non-linear
least squares. vk is the direct e￿ect of institution Xk on TVt for a country with an average mix of
policies and institutions. 'k is the interaction e￿ect between the institution/policy Xk and the
overall institutional framework, expressed as the sum of the direct e￿ects of policies/institutions
(expressed in a deviation form in the interaction).
We evaluate the partial derivatives of (3) with respect to each policy/institution to indicate
which of them has the potential to reduce earnings instability. The partial derivative of TV with
6respect to each policy/institution for a country with an average mix of policies is vk. The partial
derivative of TV with respect to policy/institution Xk for a country with an institutional mix
which di￿ers from the average is:
@TV
@Xk
= vk + 2'kvk(Xk    Xk) +
J X
j6=k
('kvj + 'jvk)(Xj    Xj) (4)
Setting all institutions, except Xk and Xj, equal to their averages we get:
@TV
@Xk
= vk + 2'kvk(Xk    Xk) + ('kvj + 'jvk)(Xj    Xj) (5)
Evaluated at the average  Xk, expression (5) becomes:
@TV
@Xk
= vk + ('kvj + 'jvk)(Xj    Xj) (6)
The sign of the partial derivative depends on the direct and the interaction e￿ects of the inter-
acting institution and its deviation from the average.
Next, in order to explore the possible cross-interactions between institutions, we compute the
cross-derivatives of TV in (3) with respect to two policies/institutions Xj and Xk, when all the
other policies/institutions are set equal to the average:
@2TV
@Xk@Xj
= 'kvj + 'jvk (7)
3.2.2 Interactions between institutions and shocks
Similar with Blanchard and Wolfers(1999) for unemployment and Sologon and O’Donoghue
(2011) for persistent inequality, we explore the role of labour market policy and institutional
factors in shaping the impact of macroeconomic shocks on earnings instability in two steps.
Common unobservable shocks and interactions with institutions
First we treat the macro shocks as unobservable but common to all countries. The macro shocks
are incorporated as time e￿ects, as shown:
TVit = t(1 +
K X
k=1
k(Xkit    Xk)) + uit (8)
t is the time e￿ect for period t. k is the interaction e￿ect between the institution/policy Xk and
the overall unobserved shock captured by t. This speci￿cation allows the e￿ect of the common
macro shocks on earnings instability to depend on the country-speci￿c mix of labour market
policies/institutions. This speci￿cation represents more a description of the data, rather than
tightly speci￿ed theoretical interactions, but it captures the basic hypothesis that given the same
shocks, countries with weaker institutions experience higher earnings instability.
7Country speci￿c observable shocks and interactions with institutions








k(Xkit    Xk)) + uit (9)
PS
s=1 sZsit is a set of observed macroeconomic shocks, which are interacted with labour market
policies and institutions. s are the direct e￿ects of shocks and k the interaction e￿ects between
the institution/policy Xk and the aggregated macroeconomic shocks.
4 Data
Our measure of earnings instability, the transitory inequality, is estimated using the ECHP 5 over
the period 1994-2001. Following the tradition of previous studies, we consider only men to avoid
the selection bias attached to female earnings. The earnings measure is the real log hourly wage
adjusted for CPI of workers aged 20 to 57, born between 1940 and 1981. Hourly earnings lower
than 50 Euros and higher than 1 Euro are disregarded. The working sample for each country
is an unbalanced panel, weighted using the "base weights" of the last wave observed for each
individual, as recommended by Eurostat. The decomposition is performed by cohorts (1940-
1950, 1951-1960, 1961-1970 and 1971-1981). For the data description and summary statistics see
Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010)(also in Sologon (2010)). Luxembourg and Austria are observed
between 1995 and 2001 and Finland between 1996 and 2001.
The link between the estimated transitory inequality (aggregated at the population level)
and labour market policies and institutions is investigated using the Bassanini and Duval (2006a,
2006b) (OECD) dataset6. The institutional variables included are: employment protection leg-
islation (EPL), trade union density, product market regulation (PMR), tax wedge, degree of
corporatism, average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate (UBRR) and spending on active
labour market programmes (ALMPs). The macroeconomic shock variables are: labour demand
shock, terms of trade shock, total factor productivity shock, and the real interest shock. These
variables are observed for each country between 1994 and 2001. Their description is included in
Table 1.7 The summary statistics of the institutional and shock variables are in Table 2. Lux-
embourg and Greece have some missing institutional and shock variables and they are dropped
from the ￿nal estimations. Portugal, Denmark and Ireland record some missing values for the
5The European Community Household Panel provided by Eurostat via the Department of Applied Economics
at the UniversitØ Libre de Bruxelles.
6The data was provided by email from the authors.
7For a detailed description, please refer to Bassanini and Duval (2006a,b).
8labour demand shock.
5 Patterns in earnings instability and policy and institutional factors across
the EU
The trends in transitory inequality, illustrated in Figure 1, show a substantial convergence in
earnings instability across Europe. Based on their converging trends in 2001, we identify two
country clusters. The cluster which converges to a lower level of earnings instability is formed
by the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Italy. Portugal records
a strong increase in transitory inequality, diverging from the other countries.
The evolution of the European labour market policies and institutions over time is shown in
Figure 2. In most countries, except Austria, France, Ireland and Greece with constant regula-
tory level, and the UK with increasing regulation, labour markets are more deregulated (EPL
decreased) in 2001 compared with early 1990s. Consistent across countries, a deregulation wave
is identi￿ed in the product market (decreasing PMR). Union density decreases in all countries,
except Belgium. Active labour market policies (ALMPs) develop in all countries (the most in the
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland), except Germany where the opposite holds. The tax wedge
decreases over time across the EU: the Anglo-Saxon countries record the largest decline, followed
by the Nordic and the Mediterranean countries. Exceptions are Austria, Belgium, Denmark and
France where the opposite is observed. The unemployment bene￿ts replacement rates (UBRR)
increase in all countries, except in Denmark, Finland and the UK. These reforms are accompa-
nied by a stable degree of corporatism across the EU. In 2001, Figure 3 reveals a substantial
institutional heterogeneity across the 14 EU countries, which has the potential to explain the
di￿erences in earnings instability across Europe. Figure 3 shows the scatter plots of pair of labour
market indicators, re-scaled by setting the UK indicators as the base. The labour market sup-
port is summarized in one indicator computed as the arithmetic average of the ALMPs and the
unemployment bene￿t RR, similar with Milberg and Winkler (2009). The scatter plot of labour
market support against the labour market regulation (EPL) indicates the presence of similar
country clusters as Boeri (2002). In the bottom left corner of the scatter plot we ￿nd the Anglo-
Saxon countries (UK and Ireland) with the lowest levels of regulation and low levels of support
in the labour market (only the UK, as Ireland o￿ers a similar support as the Nordic countries);
they also have the lowest low tax wedges and among the lowest union densities. In the upper left
corner we ￿nd the Northern countries (the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) which
adopted the "Flexicurity" model with relatively low levels of regulation and high labour market
levels, high tax wedges, a high corporatism, a high union density and moderate levels of regula-
9tion in the product market (PMR). In the lower right corner we ￿nd the Mediterranean countries
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) with the strictest regulation and a moderate support in the labour
market, a low union density and an intermediate corporatism, a relatively high PMR and tax
wedge. The other countries form the "Continental model" (Germany, France, Belgium, Austria,
Italy) with a moderate labour market regulation and labour market support, a medium-high
unionization, a high corporatism and high tax wedges.
The institutional factors are expected to interact with the macroeconomic shocks in shaping
earnings instability. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of selected macroeconomic shocks. Given
that changes in labour demand factors, technology, terms of trade, real interest do not di￿er
signi￿cantly across Europe, they cannot by themselves explain the changes in earnings instability.
These trends are not surprising, as these countries operate in the same world markets, with similar
technology, industry and occupation mixes. Ireland stands out with respect to its evolution in the
total factors productivity shock: a sharp increase is recorded until 1997, followed by stabilization
towards 2001; similarly, the real interest shock drops towards 1998 and stabilizes afterwards.
These trends are most likely related to the Celtic Tiger. As these countries face similar macro
shocks, the di￿erences in institutions may explain the di￿erences in earnings instability across
countries.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Direct e￿ects and systemic interactions
Table 3 reveals the estimates of the ￿rst model. Most direct and systemic interactions are
signi￿cant. The model has a high explanatory power, suggesting that the complex institutional
framework plays an active role in shaping earnings instability in Europe. In our discussion, unless
stated otherwise, we consider the results for a country with an average mix of policies/institutions
and a low corporatism. In this particular institutional mix, we ￿nd that countries with a stricter
labour market regulation (EPL) have on average a lower earnings instability. A similar associ-
ation is found for the generosity of the unemployment bene￿t replacement rate (UBRR)(albeit
insigni￿cant). The institutions which are positively associated with earnings instability are the
degree of unionization and corporatism, the tax wedge, the product market regulation (PMR)
and the spending on ALMPs. In order to grasp the magnitude of these e￿ects, we simulate
the changes in policies/institutions evaluated at their sample averages, which implemented sep-
arately, imply a reduction in transitory inequality by 1% relative to the average country (Table
4). The most e￿cient reforms associated with a decrease of 1% in transitory inequality are de-
creasing the tax wedge (1%) or increasing labour market regulation (1.66%); the least e￿cient
10are decreasing the spending on ALMPs (3.85%) and decreasing the union density (4.75%). All
systemic interactions are highly signi￿cant and reinforce the direct institutional e￿ects. The
transition from a decentralized economy to a corporatist economy is associated with a decrease
in earnings in earnings instability of 37%8 relative to the average country.
Evaluating the ￿rst derivative (evaluated at the min, mean, and max values of the respec-
tive institution) and the second derivative in Table 5, only union density displays a monotonic
relationship: its e￿ect is positive and stronger the higher the union density. For the other in-
stitutions, the partial derivative reverses its sign when evaluated at the min/max value of the
respective institution. For example, an increase in EPL evaluated at the highest sample value
has an increasing e￿ect on earnings instability, opposite to the e￿ects observed at lower values
of EPL. Thus too much labour market regulation exacerbates earnings instability. A similar
U-shape relationship with earnings instability is found for: the tax wedge, the PMR, the ALMPs
and the UBRR.
To explore the extent to which the e￿ect of each policy/institution varies depending on the
mix of policies in place we evaluate the partial derivatives for institutional mixes that di￿er
from the average country with a low corporatism. Table 5 shows the partial derivative of TV
with respect to each institution at its average value, evaluated at di￿erent moments of the other
institutions. Figures 6, 7 and 8 complement Table 5 by illustrating the partial derivative for
each institution at its minimum and maximum value, evaluated at di￿erent moments of the
other institutions. The e￿ect of each policy/institution, both in sign and magnitude, depends
to a large extent on the mix of policies in place, both in signs and magnitudes. For example,
for an average country, the e￿ect of each policy/institution has opposite signs in corporatist
versus decentralized economies (Table 5); the e￿ect UBRR maintains its sign but decreases its
magnitude in corporatist economies. For an average EPL, the e￿ect of EPL has opposite signs
when evaluated at min/max values of the other institutions (Table 5). This holds for most
institutions, with a some exceptions. For example, the higher the union density, the stronger the
negative e￿ect of EPL in countries with an average EPL, the stronger the positive e￿ect of PMR
in countries with an average PMR, and the stronger the positive e￿ect of ALMPs in countries
with an average spending on ALMPs (Table 5).
Next we turn to Figures 6-8. In Figure 6 (EPL) we ￿nd that for low values of EPL, the e￿ect
of EPL is negative irrespective of the policy mix. The magnitude of the e￿ect, however, varies
substantially across di￿erent policy mixes, and the strongest negative e￿ect is found when the
837% = (0:017 2:2850:017)=  TV , where  TV = :0573 is the transitory variance for a country with an average
mix of policies and a low corporatism
11spending on ALMPs is high. The same holds for low unemployment bene￿t replacement rate
(Figure 8 (UBRR)). Figure 6 (Union Density) shows that when union density is high, the e￿ect
of union density is positive for most institutional mixes. The same holds for PMR (Figure 7), for
the tax wedge (Figure 7) and for ALMPs (Figure 8). The e￿ects of the remaining institutions,
evaluated both at low and high levels, di￿er substantially across di￿erent institutional mixes,
both in magnitudes and signs (Figures 6- 8). In Table 5, the cross-derivatives of TV with respect
to pairs of policies/institutions, when all the other policies/institutions are set equal to the
average, summarize the extend to which the e￿ect of each institution varies for di￿erent levels
of the other institutions. A positive cross-derivative indicates that the e￿ect of one institution,
if positive, becomes stronger the higher the level of the second institution; if negative, it is
counteracted the higher the level of the second institution. A negative cross-derivative indicates
that the e￿ect of one institution, if negative, becomes stronger the higher the level of the second
institution; if positive, it is counteracted the higher the level of the second institution.
This model speci￿cation performs well in explaining between-country di￿erences in earnings
instability, as displayed in Figure 5 (Model 1, column 1). Our next question is how well does it
explain the evolution of earnings instability over time across the 14 EU countries? The correlation
between the change in the predicted outcome and the actual outcome is signi￿cant, positive and
strong, indicating that the model does a good job at explaining the evolution over time (see also
Figure 5 - Model 1, column 2). We ￿nd a stronger correlation for the change in earnings instability
(0,903) than the one found by Sologon and O’Donoghue (2011) for persistent inequality (0.54),
sign that the institutional reforms between 1994 and 2001 explain to a larger extent the change
in earnings instability than the change in persistent inequality across Europe.
6.2 Macroeconomic shocks and interactions
Is the institutional explanation enough? As the labour market policies/institutions interact with
the macroeconomic shocks, we are tempted to look for explanations of the di￿erential evolution
of earnings instability across Europe based on the interaction between shocks and institutions.
This section explores the role of labour market policy and institutional factors in shaping the
impact of the macroeconomic shocks earnings instability.
Common unobservable shocks and interactions
First, we treat shocks as unobservables but common to all countries. Our basic hypothesis is that,
given the same shocks, countries with weaker institutions experience higher earnings instability.
This model has a high explanatory power, slightly lower compared with the initial model. The
12estimation results are displayed in Table 6. The estimated time e￿ects indicate that for a country
with an average mix of policies (and low corporatism), earnings instability increased by 18,65%
(absolute increase of 0,0118) between 1994 and 2001. The signi￿cant interaction e￿ects indicate
that a high corporatism diminishes the adverse e￿ects of shocks on earnings instability, whereas
product market regulation and ALMPs augment them.
To get a sense of the magnitudes, column(2) gives the range of each institutional variable (in
deviation from the sample mean). We take an adverse shock that would raise earnings instability
by 1% for a country with an average mix of policies, and evaluate this e￿ect (column(3)) when
we consider, in turn min/max values of each institution. We ￿nd that the range of the e￿ects
of institutions on the impact of a given shock on earnings instability varies across institutions:
the same shock will have the strongest negative impact on earnigs instability in the country with
a high corporatism, followed by the most deregulated product market, and the least developed
ALMPs (ceteris paribus at the average). This ranks descendently the e￿ciency of each factor
in reducing the adverse e￿ects of shocks. Factors that augment the adverse e￿ects of shocks
are in a descendant order: the most developed ALMPs, the most regulated product market and
low corporatism. This model performs well in explaining the cross-country heterogeneity in the
evolution of earnings instability over the sample period, as illustrated by Figure 5 (Model 2,
column 2), and the strong positive and highly signi￿cant correlation between the actual and the
predicted change in earnings instability (0,89).
Country speci￿c observable shocks and interactions
Next, the unobservable common shocks are replaced by a set of country speci￿c observable
shocks. We consider four sources of shocks: the labour demand shift, the rate of total factor
productivity growth, the terms of trade and the real rate of interest. Due to some missing data
for some countries, the panel is slightly unbalanced. For Portugal, the information on shocks is
missing in all years, restraining the estimation sample to 80 observations.
Replacing the unobservable shocks by a set of country-speci￿c observable shocks (Table 7)
leads to a slightly lower explanatory power compared with the previous models, suggesting that
the heterogeneity in the magnitude of shocks explains part of the cross-country heterogeneity in
the earnings instability. Whereas three out of four shocks are signi￿cant, only two institutions
appear to signi￿cantly a￿ect the impact of these shocks on earnings instability. Also in this
speci￿cation, a high corporatism is an e￿ective tool in reducing the adverse e￿ects of these
shocks on earnings instability and the generosity of the unemployment bene￿t acts as a ￿lter
against the adverse e￿ects of these shocks. A positive labour demand shift and an increase in
13the real interest rate are associated with an increase in earnings instability. The opposite holds
for the terms of trade shocks.
This speci￿cation, however, performs poorly in explaining the cross-country heterogeneity in
the evolution of earnings instability over time, as indicated by Figure 5 (Model 3, column 2) and
the insigni￿cant correlation between the actual and the predicted change. Thus these shocks do
not explain the evolution in earnings instability across Europe between 1994 and 2001.
6.3 Discussion of results
We end with a discussion of the results of the three models, taking each policy driver in turn.
Employment protection legislation (EPL)
For a country with an average mix of policies/institutions and a low corporatism, we bring
evidence of a U-shape relationship between earnings instability and EPL. At low and average
levels of EPL, a stricter labour market regulation is associated with a decrease in earnings insta-
bility. At high levels of regulation, the association turns positive, suggesting that extreme levels
of EPL make the "cost" of EPL on earnings instability dominant. The literature points to the
existence of both "costs" and "bene￿ts" associated with a strict employment protection regula-
tion. Cazes and Nesporova (2003) argue against a strict EPL because of its key role in generating
labour market rigidity: EPL increases the cost of hiring and of layo￿s, and consequently lowers
labour turnover (Blanchard, 1999). A lower turnover is expected to a￿ect mainly workers with
temporary contracts, as they have a weaker protection in the labour market. Thus, the potential
"cost" of a strict EPL is widening di￿erentials between workers with regular jobs covered by the
EPL and workers with irregular jobs, unemployed job-seekers. A strict EPL "bene￿ts" covered
workers by lowering turnover and o￿ering a better protection in the labour market, thus reducing
earnings instability.
The relationship between EPL and earnings instability depends on the mix of polices in place,
suggesting that certain policy mixes augment the "costs" of EPL, whereas other mixes augment
its "bene￿ts". For example, increasing EPL from the average increases earnings instability in the
presence of a high corporatism/low tax wedge/deregulated product markets/low ALMPs/high
UBRR. These policy mixes augment the "cost" of EPL. Whereas the "bene￿t" of increasing EPL
from low values dominates across all mixes, increasing EPL from high values decreases earnings
instability only when coupled either by a high union density or a highly regulated product market
or developed APLMs or a high tax wedge.
Labour market support as spending for active labour market programs (ALMPs)
14For a country with an average mix of policies and a low corporatism, more developed ALMPs
are associated with a higher earnings instability. The ALMPs are found to exacerbate the
adverse e￿ects of macro shocks on earnings instability. These ￿ndings are consistent with our
expectations. ALMPs, which typically consist of job placement services and labour market
programmes such as job-search, vocational training or hiring subsidies can improve the e￿ciency
of job-matching, enhance the work experience and skills of the unemployed, facilitating their
reintegration into the labour market (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a,b, Sologon and O’Donoghue,
2011). These reintegrated workers, however, are the least protected in the labour market and thus
are expected to be the most a￿ected by macroeconomic shocks. In the face of macroeconomic
shocks, their presence in the labour market may amplify earnings instability.
For low levels of spending on ALMPs, increasing ALMPs is negatively associated with earn-
ings instability. This e￿ect, however, turns positive for countries with an average ALMPs,
becoming stronger the higher the level of spending on ALMPS. This signals that complementary
protection mechanisms should be put in place to protect the vulnerable groups re-integrated into
the labour market by these policies. We identify a set of policy/institutional mixes which have
the potential to reduce this increase in earnings instability or even reverse the sign. We ￿nd that
the increase in earnings instability associated with increasing ALMPs when they are already
high is considerably lower when accompanied by highly regulated labour markets, by a high cor-
poratism, by low non-wage labour costs, and by high unemployment bene￿t replacement rates.
Under the same conditions, increasing ALMPs from an average level is actually associated with
a decrease in earnings instability. Similarly, each of these conditions reinforce the negative e￿ect
of increasing ALMPs when they are low. This indicates that these institutional circumstances
assure a smoother reintegration of workers into the labour market. Generous unemployment
bene￿ts favour a better job-matching, thus more stable employment pro￿le for the reintegrated
workers; low tax wedges (non-wage labour costs) favour less costly and faster reintegration into
the labour market; and highly regulated labour markets and corporatist economies may provide
a better labour market protection for the reintegrated workers.
Labour market support as average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate (UBRR)
For an average country with either low or average UBRRs, more generous unemployment
bene￿ts are associated with a lower earnings instability and are found to limit the adverse e￿ect
of shocks on earnings instability. These ￿ndings have two potential explanations. First, this
negative e￿ect may be spurious, if we consider the "cost" of generous unemployment bene￿ts for
unemployment: they are expected to weaken the job-search intensity, decrease the employability
and human capital for the unemployed, and consequently exclude them from the labour market.
15As this group is more prone to earnings instability, their exclusion from the labour market
hides part of the earnings instability. This explanation is supported by Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999) who ￿nds that generous unemployment bene￿ts lead to a larger e￿ect of adverse shocks
on unemployment. Second, generous unemployment bene￿ts, have also associated "bene￿ts".
Their "bene￿t" is that longer and more generous unemployment bene￿ts represent incentives
not to accept low-paid jobs, thereby improving job-matching. A better job-matching increases
the likelihood of more stable employment and earnings pro￿les (Bassanini and Duval, 2006b,
2006a), which in turn imply a lower earnings instability.
The unemployment spells have an averse e￿ect on the employability and the human capital
accumulation of the unemployed, expected to increase their earnings vulnerability once they re-
enter the labour market, unless protection mechanisms and developed ALMPs are in place to
counteract this increase in earnings instability. We ￿nd that the decrease in earnings instability
associated with an increase in the UBRR is the largest when the ALMPs are very developed.
Thus developed ALMPs have the potential to counteract the adverse e￿ect of increasing the
generosity of the UBRR for earnings instability, similar with unemployment (Bassanini and
Duval, 2006a,b). Evaluated at low levels, the generosity of the UBRR is negatively associated
with earnings instability for most policy mixes. Evaluated at very high values, the e￿ect of
UBRR on earnings instability varies substantially depending on the institutional mix.
Trade unions
For an average institutional mix and a low corporatism, the higher the degree of unionization,
the higher the earnings instability. This is a surprising result, given that the stated purpose of
unions is to reduce earnings disparities (OECD, 2004). Our ￿ndings suggest that, for this insti-
tutional mix, the "cost" of unionization outweighs its "bene￿t". The "bene￿t" of unionization
stems indirectly from its impact on training and minimum wage. By forcing employers to pro-
vide training to their employees, they increase the employees’ human capital and adaptability to
new technologies (Aghion and Williamson, 2001), thus reducing earnings instability for covered
workers. However, even if unions decrease the within-group earnings instability, they may still
increase the overall earnings instability by increasing the between-group di￿erentials, between
unionized and non-unionized workers.
The e￿ect of unionization on earnings instability is found to depend on the mix of policies in
place, a sign that the "cost" of increasing unionization from the average is mitigated when coupled
with the right policies. We ￿nd that the e￿ect of unionization depends on corporatism: a higher
unionization is negatively associated with earnings instability in corporatist economies, opposite
to what we ￿nd for decentralized economies. This is consistent with the evidence that unions in
16decentralized economies push towards claiming a larger share of the surplus, e￿ect mitigated in
corporatist economies which bene￿t from a higher coordination (Teulings and Hartog, 2008).
Evaluated at the average, the "cost" of unionization for earnings instability is mitigated also
by a highly regulated labour market / a low tax wedge / a deregulated product market/ low
ALMPs / high unemployment bene￿ts. Evaluated at its minimum, the "cost" is mitigated by
a highly regulated labour market / a low tax wedge/ a deregulated product market / low levels
of spending on ALMPs / high UBRRs. Evaluated at its maximum, the "cost" is mitigated only
for the average country with a minimum tax wedge.
Corporatism
We ￿nd that countries with an average institutional mix and a corporatist economy have a
lower earnings instability than countries with an average institutional mix and a decentralized
economy. Consistent across models, we ￿nd a strong negative signi￿cant interaction e￿ect with
the macroeconomic shocks, suggesting that corporatist systems are e￿ective in reducing the
adverse e￿ects of macroeconomic shocks on earnings instability. Our ￿nding runs counter to
the traditional view that corporatism generates labour market rigidity, but it is consistent with
the recent research on the impact of corporatism on wage structures. Teulings and Hartog
(2008) argue that corporatist systems can be very ￿exible, even more so than decentralized ones,
because they allow the contracts to be renegotiated to ensure a smooth adjustment to aggregate
shocks. As corporatist systems deal with the adjustment to aggregate shocks, they can prevent
the exacerbation of earnings instability in the presence of adverse shocks.
From the cross-institutional interactions, the corporatist systems emerge as desired comple-
ments for counteracting the increase in earnings instability associated with the development of
ALMPs, with the generosity of the unemployment bene￿ts, with unionization, with the regulation
in the product market and with the tax wedge. This suggest that a high degree of coordination
has the potential of keeping earnings instability low.
Product market regulation (PMR)
The "bene￿t" of more regulated sectors is that they display more compressed and more
stable earnings structures and are therefore expected have a lower earnings instability than
non-regulated sectors. Whereas the "bene￿t" emerges within the regulated sectors, the "cost"
emerges when taking a larger perspective by including also non-regulated sectors: the potential
"cost" of a stricter product market regulation is widening transitory di￿erentials between workers
in non-regulated sectors and those in regulated sectors. Deregulation in the product market is
expected to increase competition, lower market rents and wages, thereby increasing earnings
17instability in the previously regulated sectors (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).
We ￿nd that some policy mixes augment the "costs" of a strict regulation in the product
market, whereas other mixes augment the "bene￿ts". For a country with an average mix and a
low corporatism, a stricter regulation in the product market is associated with a higher earnings
instability. Regulated product markets also appear to exacerbate the adverse e￿ects of macro
shocks on earnings instability. For corporatist systems, however, a stricter PMR is associated
with a lower earnings instability. The "cost" of increasing PMR from the average is also mitigated
in the presence of a highly regulated labour market / a low tax wedge / a high UBRR. The "cost"
of increasing PMR from high values is mitigated only for an average country with a minimum
tax wedge. In deregulated product markets, the e￿ect of a stricter regulation varies substantially
depending on the institutional mix.
7 Concluding remarks
The concerns regarding the economic insecurity stemming from earnings instability have been
gaining momentum in the contemporary political discourse given the recent ￿ndings which show
increasing cross-sectional earnings di￿erentials stemming from increasing earnings instability,
both in the US and Europe. If we consider earnings instability as a proxy for risk and that
individuals are averse to earnings variability, then increasing earnings instability bears substantial
welfare costs. Whereas most studies focused on identifying earnings instability, little is known
regarding the potential driving factors. Our paper takes the ￿rst step towards understanding the
complex relationship between earnings instability and labour market policies and institutions.
We explore this relationship in a European context. The European institutions have been long
regarded as a source of labour market rigidity, but the economic reality of the 1990s pressured
Europe to move towards more ￿exible labour markets. A series of labour market reforms have
implemented across Europe, increasing the country-heterogeneity in labour market policies and
institutions (Palier, 2010). This heterogeneity has the potential to help us understand the cross-
national di￿erences in earnings instability across Europe.
One concern regarding the reforms aimed to boost labour market ￿exibility in Europe is
whether a higher labour market ￿exibility is likely to increase earnings instability, and which
are the potential labour market policies/institutions that can counteract this increase. Using
the OECD labour market indicators and the predicted transitory variance from Sologon and
O’Donoghue (2010), in this study we explore by means of non-linear least squares the relationship
between earnings instability and labour market policies and institutions across 14 EU countries
between 1994 and 2001.
18We bring evidence of a complex system of interactions within the institutional framework
a￿ecting earnings instability, where the e￿ects of most institutions/policies depend to a large
extent on the institutional mix. For a country with an average mix of policies/institutions and a
low corporatism, we ￿nd a U-shape relationship between earnings instability and the strictness
of labour market regulation. This shows that low to moderate levels of EPL o￿er protection
against earnings instability, but strict levels are associated with a higher earnings instability.
Corporatist systems have a lower earnings instability than decentralized economies, and are
e￿ective in reducing the adverse e￿ects of macroeconomic shocks on earnings instability. Our
￿ndings bring supporting evidence that corporatist systems can be very ￿exible, even more so
than decentralized ones, in line with Teulings and Hartog (2008)’s current ￿ndings regarding the
impact of corporatism on wage structures. As corporatist systems deal with the adjustment to
aggregate shocks, they limit the increase in earnings instability in the presence of adverse shocks.
The degree of corporatism a￿ects signi￿cantly the relationship between earnings instability
and the other policies/institutions. For a country with an average mix of policies and a decen-
tralized economy, the spending on ALMPs, the union density, the product market regulation and
the non-wage labour costs are positively associated with earnings instability. These associations
are reversed in corporatist economies, suggesting that corporatist systems can counteract the
increase in earnings instability associated with the development of ALMPs, with unionization,
with the regulation in the product market and with the tax wedge.
We ￿nd that the earnings instability associated with developed ALMPs is augmented in pe-
riods of adverse macroeconomic shocks. These policies are a crucial instrument for reintegrating
the vulnerable groups into the labour market. To counteract the increase in earnings instability,
these policies need to be accompanied by appropriate protection mechanisms. We identi￿ed a few
institutional mixes, as deviations from the average country, which have the potential to achieve
this goal when they accompany the development of ALMPs: regulated labour markets, a high
corporatism, low non-wage labour costs and high unemployment bene￿t replacement rates. We
also ￿nd that the decrease in earnings instability associated with an increase in the UBRR is
the largest when the ALMPs are very developed, sign that developed ALMPs have the potential
to counteract the potential the adverse e￿ect of increasing the generosity of the unemployment
bene￿t for earnings instability, similar with unemployment (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a,b).
Denmark and the Netherlands have among the most ￿exible labour markets in Europe, but
their earnings instability di￿ers considerably. In Denmark, earnings instability increased slightly
over time, with a negligible e￿ect on the overall inequality. In the Netherlands, earnings instabil-
ity is 2.6 times higher in 2001 compared with 1994 and contributes signi￿cantly to the increase
19in overall inequality. The di￿erence between the two countries comes from their "Flexicurity"
models. The Dutch "Flexicurity" model determined an impressive growth in employment in the
1990s, but this growth was entirely in part-time jobs which account for 70% of all low-wage
workers (Salverda, 2008). The collective agreements in the Netherlands, however, provided an
insu￿cient protection for this vulnerable segment of the economy (see Salverda (2008)). This
may explain the staggering increase in earnings instability in the Netherlands. The lesson to be
drawn is that the institutional framework in place needs to be adapted to re-integrate the vulner-
able groups into the labour market, to o￿er adequate protection, and to favour their investment
in human capital for future stable careers.
20Table 1: Description of OECD Variables.
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006)
EPL= Employment Protection Leg-
islation
OECD summary indicator of the stringency
of Employment Protection Legislation. EPL
ranges from 0 to 6.
Union Density Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of work-
ers a￿liated to a trade union, in %.
Degree of Corporatism Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-
ordination of the wage bargaining processes,
which takes values 1 for decentralised and un-
coordinated processes, and 2 and 3 for interme-
diate and high
Tax Wedge The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal in-
come tax and all social security contributions as
a percentage of total labour cost.
PMR= Product Market Regulation OECD summary indicator of regulatory impedi-
ments to product market competition in seven
non-manufacturing industries. The data used
in this paper cover regulations and market con-
ditions in seven energy and service industries.
PMR ranges from 0 to 6.
ALMPs = Public expenditures on
active labour market policies
Public expenditures on active labour market
programmes per unemployed worker as a share
of GDP per capita, in %.
Average unemployment bene￿t re-
placement rate
Average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate
across two income situations (100% and 67% of
APW earnings), three family situations (single,
with dependent spouse, with spouse in work)
Labour Demand Shock Logarithm of the labour share in business sec-
tor GDP purged from the short-run in￿uence of
factor prices.
Terms of Trade Shock Logarithm of the relative price of imports
weighted by the share of imports in GDP
Total Factor Productivity Shock Deviation of the logarithm of Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) from its trend calculated
by means of a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ￿lter
(smoothing parameter  = 100)
Real Interest Shock Di￿erence between the 10-year nominal govern-
ment bond yield (in %) and the annual change
in the GDP de￿ator (in %).
21Table 2: Institutional Variables - Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall 2.423 0.956 0.600 3.854 N = 101
EPL between 0.944 0.621 3.739 n = 13
within 0.251 1.537 3.211 T = 7.769
overall 0.371 0.191 0.096 0.794 N = 108
Union Density between 0.201 0.098 0.779 n = 14
within 0.017 0.302 0.429 T = 7.714
overall 2.570 0.649 1.000 3.000 N = 93
Degree of Corporatism between 0.669 1.000 3.000 n = 12
within 0.000 2.570 2.570 T = 7.75
overall 0.326 0.068 0.128 0.449 N = 93
Tax Wedge between 0.067 0.219 0.404 n = 12
within 0.022 0.234 0.390 T = 7.75
overall 3.394 1.015 1.133 5.236 N = 93
PMR between 0.871 1.454 4.415 n = 12
within 0.563 2.155 4.459 T = 7.75
overall 0.301 0.209 0.048 1.261 N = 93
ALMPs between 0.188 0.094 0.750 n = 12
within 0.101 -0.035 0.812 T = 7.75
overall 0.360 0.117 0.166 0.649 N = 93
Unemployment Bene￿t RR between 0.115 0.174 0.599 n = 12
within 0.030 0.271 0.451 T = 7.75
overall 0.062 0.062 -0.075 0.167 N = 85
Labour demand shock between 0.063 -0.068 0.147 n = 11
within 0.013 0.028 0.099 T=7.727
overall -0.094 0.040 -0.178 -0.027 N = 93
Terms of Trade Shocks between 0.035 -0.146 -0.042 n = 12
within 0.022 -0.142 -0.041 T=7.75
overall 0.007 0.016 -0.058 0.047 N = 85
Total Factor Production Shock between 0.007 -0.001 0.019 n = 11
within 0.015 -0.056 0.049 T=7.727
overall 0.039 0.018 -0.016 0.080 N = 93
Real Interest Shock between 0.007 0.023 0.045 n = 12
within 0.017 -0.001 0.088 T=7.75
22Table 3: Transitory Variance - Systemic interactions across institutions.
Direct e￿ect of institutions Estimate t
EPL -0,014 *** -3,370
Union density 0,032 ** 2,420
High Corporatism 0,017 *** 3,990
Tax wedge 0,176 *** 5,810
PMR 0,006 *** 2,850
ALMPs 0,050 ** 2,590
Average replacement rate -0,040 -1,340
Systemic interactions
EPL -0,607 *** -5,960
Union density 1,460 *** 3,470
High Corporatism -2,285 *** -16,340
Tax wedge 6,702 *** 4,840
PMR 0,378 *** 4,050
ALMPs 2,614 *** 5,460
Average replacement rate -3,305 *** -3,760
Adjusted R2 0,949
Observations 93
Table 4: Transitory Variance - Simulated relative reforms resulting in 1% decrease in TV relative
to the average country.
Change in institutions relative to their average Change in TV relative to the average country
EPL 1,66% -1%
Union density -4,75% -1%
Tax wedge -1,00% -1%
PMR -2,61% -1%
ALMPs -3,85% -1%
Average replacement rate 4,00% -1%


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 6: Transitory Variance - Time e￿ects interacted with institutions.
[1] [2] [3]
Estimates Range of Implied relative change in TV
institutions/ due to an adverse shock
policies which increases TV by 1%
for the average country
(TV for mean institutions
and shocks = 0,0636 )
t Min Max Min Max
Time e￿ects* 0,0118
EPL 0,0109 0,29 -1,82167 1,4325 -1,01% 2,58%
Union density 0,1089 0,65 -0,27631 0,4212 -2,04% 5,63%
High corporatism -0,3681*** -6,74 0 1 1,00% -36,18%
Tax wedge -0,2774 -0,68 -0,19774 0,1232 6,54% -2,45%
PMR 0,0572* 1,82 -2,26252 1,8403 -12,07% 11,63%
ALMPs 0,2904* 1,77 -0,25193 0,9610 -6,39% 29,18%
Average replacement rate -0,4354 -1,43 -0,19437 0,2892 9,55% -11,72%
Adj. R2 0,9366
Obs. 93
Table 7: Transitory Variance - Observed shocks interacted with institutions.
Estimates t
EPL -0,0576 -0,62
Union density -0,1306 -0,39
High corporatism -0,2104* -1,98
Tax wedge 1,1377 1,07
PMR 0,0051 0,11
ALMPs 0,2680 0,99
Average replacement rate -1,0866*** -2,75
LD shift 0,1094*** 3,3
Terms of trade -0,3146*** -6,94
TFP growth -0,1789 -1,37







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Terms of Trade Shock
Total Factor Productivity Shock
Rate of Interest Shock
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Figure 6: E￿ect of EPL (left) / Union Density(UD) (right) at its maximum/minimum value
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Figure 7: E￿ect of the Tax Wedge(TW) (left) / PMR (right) at its maximum/minimum value
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Figure 8: E￿ect of ALMPs (left) / Unemployment bene￿t replacement rate(UBRR) (right) at its
maximum/minimum value evaluated for min/mean/max values of other factors, ceteris paribus
at the average
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